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The Odd Couple: Ending the Jordanian-Syrian "Cold War" 




Of all the bilateral relationships between Arab states, the Jordanian-Syrian relationship has 
been among the most tumultuous. Jordanian-Syrian relations have, more often than not, been 
marked by varying degrees of mutual hostility and even violence. These periods of animosity 
have been so frequent that they amounted to a local ‘Cold War’ even in the midst of the many 
other conflicts in the region. But with regime changes in both Amman and Damascus, a marked 
thaw has emerged in Jordanian-Syrian relations, seemingly ending another long period of 
acrimony. But this type of event has happened once before: in the late 1970s when Jordan and 
Syria shifted from antagonism to alliance. This article examines both the historic and current 
attempts to end the Jordanian-Syrian Cold War, so that the earlier episode may shed some light 
on the present and future of Jordanian-Syrian relations. 
 
ARTICLE 
Throughout their histories as independent states, Jordan and Syria have had a tenuous 
relationship at best, marked by temporary military alliances during wars with 
Israel, but more often by varying degrees of mutual hostility. These long periods of 
hostility were so extensive, in fact, that they amounted to a local "Cold War" in the 
midst of the many other conflicts already operating in the region. Today, however, a 
marked thaw has emerged in Jordanian-Syrian relations. The thaw began only in 
1999, but within two years it had shifted already from a cold war, to a cold peace, and 
then even to more meaningful cooperation and coordination. By 2001, some officials 
were even talking of the potential for a full Jordanian-Syrian alliance.1 
 
The successful ending of the Jordanian-Syrian Cold War certainly marks a new 
chapter in the history of these two states' bilateral relations. But despite the long 
history of acrimony between Amman and Damascus, this type of event has actually 
happened once before: in the late 1970s when Jordan and Syria shifted from antagonism 
to full-scale alliance. This article examines both the historic and current attempts 
at bringing the Jordanian-Syrian Cold War to an end, providing an empirical 
analysis of both episodes with the hope that the earlier case may shed light on the 
present and future of the Jordanian-Syrian relationship. This change in Jordanian- 
Syrian relations marks a critical but largely unnoticed shift in the international relations 
of the modem Middle East. The change is especially important in the context of 
renewed violence in the region — from the second Intifada to the insurgency in Iraq 
— and given the atmosphere in Washington, DC, of hostility, threats, and economic 
sanctions against Syria, even as the US-Jordanian alliance seems closer than ever. In 
the analysis that follows, I will first provide an overview of the history of tensions 
between Jordan and Syria, before moving on to examine in tum the origins of the 
1975-79 Jordanian-Syrian alliance and finally, the current warming in Jordanian- 
Syrian relations since 1999. 
 
 
THE JORDANIAN-SYRIAN COLD WAR 
 
In the 1950s and 1960s inter-Arab relations were characterized by an "Arab 
Cold War. 2  The Arab Cold War, usually associated with the era of Egyptian President 
Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir, featured an inter-Arab struggle for power and influence between 
Nasir and his Ba'thist rivals. But it also pitted conservative, pro-Western monarchies 
(such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Jordan) against more radical, revolutionary 
republics (such as Egypt, Iraq, Libya, and Syria). But even within that broad 
regional dynamic, Jordan and Syria remained in many respects a classic study in 
opposites, as well as in rivalry. 3 
 
Jordan under King Husayn became the classic conservative monarchy with a 
foreign policy that was virulently anti-communist, moderate in its policies toward 
Israel, and an ally of Western powers. Syria, in contrast, remained fiercely anti-colonial 
and became virtually the archetype of the revolutionary republic, led by 
various colonels and generals following a succession of coups d'etat, until the 1970 
coup brought Hafiz al-Asad to power. Asad changed the country's image as a coup 
factory, establishing his own Ba'thist authoritarian regime and ruling until his death 
in 2000. While Jordan allied itself closely with the US, Syria allied itself with the 
Soviet Union. 
 
At both the global and regional levels, both countries had constructed identities 
that stood in contrast to one another.' 4  The Hashimite Kingdom was, of course, decidedly 
royalist, moderate in its foreign policy, cautious, and conservative. Syria was 
anti-monarchist, more militant in its foreign policy, revolutionary, and radical. These 
socially-constructed images are held even today by many participants and observers 
of Middle East politics. But these remain constructs from as early as the 1950s, and 
are today only partly accurate, and partly national stereotype. While still different 
from one another in many significant ways, Jordan and Syria are no longer the stark 
pair of opposites they once were. With major regime changes in both countries, their 
policies toward one another have changed dramatically. But for most of their modern 
histories, the two countries more often than not had maintained a cold war of their 
own. Recriminations between the two were particularly harsh after the 1967 War, 
given the sheer magnitude of the loss. Israel had launched a surprise attack (in its view 
a preemptive strike) and within six days it had destroyed the air forces and later 
defeated the armies of Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. For Syria, the 1967 defeat included 
the loss of the strategic Golan Heights to Israel. For Jordan, the disaster had cost the 
Hashimites all of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, while thousands of Palestinian 
refugees fled across the border into the Jordanian Kingdom. 
 
In 1970, tensions exploded within Jordan in the form of the Jordanian Civil War 
between the Hashimite armies of King Husayn and the guerrilla forces of the Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO). This bloody affair, known to Palestinian nationalists 
as "Black September" and to some Jordanian nationalists as "White September," 
was not limited to Palestinian-Jordanian fighting alone. Indeed, in September 1970, 
Syrian military forces crossed the Jordanian border, launching an unsuccessful invasion 
of northern Jordan in support of PLO forces. The Syrian forces were eventually 
defeated and turned back, but thereafter any Syrian military build-up on the border 
had to be regarded in Jordan as more than a hypothetical threat. 
 
Yet, by October 1973, Egypt and Syria had colluded in launching an attack on 
Israel, later supported by the Saudi-led oil embargo, in a conflict known alternatively 
as the October, Ramadan, or Yom Kippur War. Jordanian forces refused to open a 
third front against Israel, but did send minimal forces to defend Syria on the Golan. 
According to one of Jordan's top generals at the time, war was not an option for 
Jordan, still recovering from the debacle of the 1967 War and the disastrous 1970-71 
Civil War: 
 
We lacked air defense, and sufficient numbers of troops. And in addition to 
that, they [Egypt and Syria] did not choose to inform Jordan in the first place 
[about the planned attack]. And they then tried to drag Jordan in, with inevi- 
table catastrophic effects. I asked [Syrian President] Asad, why do you now 
ask us? Asad argued that there were political advantages to be reaped. But I 
responded that there will be no Jordan left to reap the advantages. If Syria 
liberates the Golan, Egypt liberates the Sinai, then you've got a point ... We 
convinced them, that if Jordan joined the battle, it would become the tnain 
target of the Israelis. We were dragged into the 1967 War and we lost the West 
Bank. We couldn't afford to lose the East Bank ... Asad seemed to understand 
our position, but he still disagreed. But what they were facing in the Golan 
and Sinai still left the vast majority of Israeli forces facing Jordan ... Anyway, 
we did compromise. We did send units to the Golan. But this did not involve 
direct confrontation with Israel through our lines. 5 
 
The gesture may have seemed small, but it was iti the aftermath of that campaign, 
between 1975 and 1979, that Jordan and Syria would finally shift from hostility to 
alliance. 
 
By the end of the decade, however, the more familiar pattern of animosity had 
returned. Thus by 1980, Jordan and Syria had de-aligned once again with extensive 
saber-rattling on their mutual border. The Jordanian-Syrian Cold War had indeed 
returned in full force. Throughout the 1980s, Jordan supported Iraq, while Syria 
supported Iran in the eight-year long Iran-Iraq War. But beyond throwing their support 
behind opposite powers in the 1990-91 Gulf War, the tensions between Jordan 
and Syria also had profound domestic consequences as each intervened in the domestic 
politics and stability of the other.' 6 
 
It remains unclear how direct a role either government played in the destabilization 
that followed, but suffice it to say that each blamed the other, in particular for 
subverting domestic security. The Syrian government specifically charged the Jordanians 
with providing aid, support, and sanctuary to Syrian Islamists. 7  Even Jordan's 
own prime ministers do not agree on this point. Former Prime Minister Ahmad 
'Ubaydat (1984-85), for example, vehemently denied that any such subversion ever 
took place with support from the Jordanian government.  8 One of his rivals, also a 
former prime minister, suggested that Jordan did indeed support the Muslim Brotherhood 
in Syria, but that this policy (a mistake in his view) was carried out without the 
knowledge of King Husayn.9  Another former prime minister argued that Jordanian- 
Syrian problems remained broader still, and were rooted in disregard for the other's 
sovereignty and security:10 
 
 
They [the Syrians] have even at times claimed us as southern Syrians. Then 
again, we Hashimites have at times seen them as our northern inheritance. But 
Syria likes to be the power. It likes its hegemony. But Jordan could never 
accept this. Syria works through Lebanon or through Jordan to irritate Israel. 
But we resent this. It also affects our own security.'" 
 
Regardless of whether opponents of either regime received external support or not, in 
many respects the 1980s version of the Jordanian-Syrian Cold War appeared to have 
become a mukhabarat v. muiciiabarat struggle, in a sort of localized version of the 
global US-Soviet Cold War and its associated espionage campaigns. 
 
In 1990, after Iraq invaded Kuwait, Jordan and Syria took almost opposite stands 
once again — but in each case, surprising many observers. Syria elected to join the 
US-led coalition against Iraq, while Jordan attempted to mediate between the antagonists 
(unsuccessfully) while calling for an inter-Arab solution rather than foreign 
intervention. 11 Jordanian policy-makers argued that Jordan's position was the defmition 
of balance: neither sending troops to defend Iraq, nor joining the US-led military 
coalition. 12  Three years after the Gulf War, in 1994, Jordan signed its peace treaty 
with Israel, but more than a decade later, Israeli-Syrian relations remained coldly 
hostile. Throughout these decades of policy differences and animosity, the Jordanian 
and Syrian regimes differed not only on relations with Israel, but also on relations 
with the PLO. One Syrian policy-maker, and sometime advisor to President Hafiz al- 
Asad, emphasized this as a central factor in inter-Arab politics, but particularly so in 
Jordanian-Syrian relations and rivalry. Regarding this time period, he argued that: 
 
The most important factor in inter-Arab relations is each country's relationship 
with the PLO. Jordan and Syria are the only two Arab states adjacent to 
Israel who are eligible — after [Egyptian President] Sadat's visit to Jerusalem 
— to "control" the PLO, let's say. So the question is who will exercise more 
control over the PLO, Amman or Damascus? 13 
 
Beyond even the causal factors, however, the Jordanian-Syrian Cold War seemed to 
have developed its own tragic inertia. Indeed, beyond even policy differences, the 
level of mutual suspicion and distrust between the two regimes also became deeply 
personally entrenched in the persons of President Hafiz al-Asad and King Husayn. 
 
With the passing of these two powerful antagonists, and the emergence of a new 
generation of leaders, Jordan and Syria were able to make a second attempt at ending 
their longstanding cold war. Thus, for decades, the prevailing trends in Jordanian- 
Syrian relations amounted simply to varying degrees of hostility — from diplomatic 
rifts, to political threats, to actual acts of military and civil violence. But both in the 
1970s and again today, the Jordanian-Sydan Cold War was brought to an end. The 
question, of course, is whether the current warming will — like the 1975-79 version 
— prove to be temporary. 
 
These major shifts from animosity to friendship and cooperation have implications 
for scholars of international relations. Neorealists, for example, argue that patterns 
of inter-state relations and especially of conflict and realignment are predicated 
on major external security shifts. Such shifts in the regional balance of power, or 
balance of threats, trigger alignment and realignment among states. 14  But as the empirical 
evidence in this analysis will show, the Jordanian-Syrian relationship suggests 
that domestic politics and political economy are more important causal factors than 
those found in external systemic or structural changes. To explain fully Jordanian- 
Syrian relations, therefore, we must look beyond simply external structural changes, 
and focus on factors emphasized by many of the critics of Neorealism — factors such 
as the political economy of regime security and attempts by regimes to balance between 
domestic and international threats to their survival. 15  In the sections that follow, 
I will turn first to an examination of the 1975-79 Jordanian-Syrian alliance, then 
to the current ending of the Jordanian-Syrian Cold War, and finally — in comparing 
the two episodes — I will discuss the implications of current Jordanian-Syrian relations 
for regional politics. 
 
 
ENDING THE JORDANIAN-SYRIAN COLD WAR, PARTI: 1975-79 
 
In the aftermath of the 1973 October War, Jordan sought to capitalize on its 
(albeit limited) participation in that conflict as a means to re-enter the mainstream of 
Arab regional politics. Jordan was then still vilified for its 1970-71 Civil War and 
suppression of the PLO, and even for its limited commitment to the 1973 Arab-Israeli 
War. Syria proved to be especially receptive to Jordan's attempt at inter-Arab reconciliation. 
Given the frequent bouts of hostility emanating from Damascus, which the 
Hashimite regime had come to regard as virtually routine, this seemed rather surprising. 
Very quickly, however, Jordan's period of inter-Arab isolation, from 1970 to 
1973, had shifted in the post-war period to a steadily warming relationship with 
Syria. In the 1970s, as in the late 1990s, regime change proved to be a key causal 
factor. Following the failed Syrian military intervention in the Jordanian Civil War, 
Syria's Defense Minister Hafiz al-Asad seized power in a military coup and launched 
his "corrective movement" {al-haraka al-tashihiyya). According to Jordan's Prime 
Minister at the time, Ahmad al-Lawzi, this abrupt regime change in Damascus helped 
spur rapprochement between Jordan and Syria surprisingly quickly, particularly as 
Asad consolidated his rule in 1971. 16  These exchanges helped normalize Jordanian- 
Syrian relations, merely months after Jordanian and Syrian forces had clashed during 
Jordan's Civil War. By 1975, the relationship had shifted from hostility to entente, 
and from entente to alliance. 
 
The Jordanian-Syrian alignment began with a flurry of meetings and diplomatic 
exchanges, which resulted first in a series of economic agreements and later evolved 
to include cooperation in security affairs as well. Jordanian Prime Minister Zayd al- 
Rifa'i first broached the subject of closer Jordanian-Syrian relations in a visit to 
Damascus, in March of 1975, where he met with President Asad. The very fact that 
Rifa'i had been appointed Prime Minister at this time, given his known Syrian connections, 
made clear the Hashimite regime's determination to develop stronger bilateral 
ties. The March 1975 meeting in Damascus produced a favorable and substantive 
response to Jordan's overtures as both countries agreed to establish a joint committee 
to help coordinate the strengthening of their relationship.17 
 
The Prime Minister's successful trip to Damascus was quickly followed by an 
official state visit to the Syrian capital by King Husayn in April 1975. Once again, 
substantial progress was made, and the development of a Jordanian-Syrian alignment 
was well under way as the two heads of state signed a bilateral trade agreement. The 
momentum accelerated with a reciprocal visit by President Asad to Amman — his 
first trip there — in June 1975. This time the level of ties was elevated by the creation 
of a Joint Higher Committee, which moved beyond the economic issues covered by 
the earlier committee to include political and diplomatic coordination as well. And 
this time, underscoring the increasing seriousness and depth of the bilateral ties, the 
co-chairs of the committee were to be the Jordanian and Syrian prime ministers themselves. 18 
 
In short, the new alignment spanned the range of low and high politics issues, 
and to a large extent was consciously constructed "from the bottom up."19  The Jordanians, 
in particular, were eager to build a solid basis for the alignment, in order to 
create substantive bilateral linkages — and thereby firm roots — across a range of 
issue areas, from trade and manufacturing to communications and education. These 
goals did indeed succeed for a time. This earlier attempt to end the Jordanian-Syrian 
Cold War and to create an alliance was rooted, I argue, mainly in domestic concerns 
for the political economy of regime security. But it was also influenced, if to a lesser 
extent, by changes in external regional politics. 
 
The main external and regional changes affecting the development of the new 
alignment concerned the results of the October 1973 War. While not a clear victory 
for the Arab forces, neither was it the decisive defeat that the 1967 War had been. 
While Egypt and Syria were still technically allied to one another, their relationship 
had soured in the immediate aftermath of the war, with the Asad regime believing that 
Sadat had essentially abandoned Syria during the war itself. 20  Furthermore, Asad 
mistrusted Sadat's motives, found him to be an unreliable ally, and suspected him of 
planning a separate peace with Israel. As the distance grew between the Egyptian and 
Syrian positions, so did the rift between Egypt and Jordan. As noted above, this had 
been triggered in particular by Sadat's anger at Jordan's failure to open up a third 
front against Israel. The Jordanian regime, in contrast, felt that it had fulfilled its 
obligations exactly as it had promised before the war. Sadat, the Jordanians charged, 
had changed his mind in the midst of the war itself only when the tide of battle had 
turned against him, and simply wanted a Jordanian offensive to allow him a better 
chance at maintaining his military position in Sinai. While Sadat had publicly and 
bitterly denounced Jordan after the war, policy-makers within the Hashimite regime 
argued that Sadat's high-sounding intentions were not really for the good of the broader 
Arab cause, but were characterized rather by a willingness to fight "to the last Jordanian" 
in order to liberate Egyptian territory. 21 
 
As these exchanges continued, however, it became clear to the regimes in both 
Damascus and Amman that they had in common a similar type of rift between themselves 
and the Sadat regime in Cairo. Indeed, even in interviews 20 years after the 
war, both Jordanian and Syrian officials grew visibly angry in recalling their grievances 
against Sadat in particular. 22 Jordan and Syria also shared a strong economic 
incentive to assuage Saudi Arabia, with a view to gaining greater access to financial 
aid from the Saudi regime. This, however, suggests that economic factors were already 
outweighing external security concerns. Eor all their differences as political 
regimes, Syria's radical republic and Jordan's conservative monarchy both presided 
over fairly poor countries, and both remained economically dependent on wealthy 
allies. 23 
 
This developing dynamic within the regional political economy of oil and aid 
led in part to the opening between Jordan and Syria, and while Jordan's role in the 
defense of the Golan Heights was minor, it was nonetheless appreciated in Damascus 
at the time. The wartime act of solidarity thus became a useful symbol of cooperation 
between the two regimes, and may have eased the process of rapprochement between 
them by providing a historical bridge between the unfortunate 1970 episode of armed 
conflict and the 1975 emergence of a full-fledged alignment. 
 
The Syrian-Jordanian alignment, while concerned mainly with economic and 
political cooperation, did evolve to include some external security and defense issues. 
Syrian military planners began to adjust their strategic plans to include defense of the 
Irbid Heights in northwest Jordan, as a link to the Golan Heights and as a possible way 
to outflank Israeli forces in a future conflict. Coordination along these lines developed 
to include joint military maneuvers and exercises. 24 
 
In more active policy terms, Jordan signaled its willingness to support Syria in 
its 1976 intervention in the Lebanese Civil War. While the Lebanese crisis was not 
itself an external cause leading to the initial alignment, it did help to reinforce it, 
particularly when King Husayn immediately made clear his support for Syrian intervention. 25 
A second crisis in regional affairs contributed still further to Jordanian- 
Syrian solidarity: the growing hostility between the regimes in Damascus and Baghdad. 26 
The Lebanese crisis, in fact, helped to trigger a renewed political conflict 
between Syria and Iraq. As Iraqi statements became more belligerent toward Syria 
(including in regard to the latter's role in Lebanon), Jordanian forces were redeployed 
to Jordan's eastern border with Iraq, and the Hashimite regime made clear that it 
would support Syria against any Iraqi invasion. While the actual threat of such an 
invasion had been slight at best, the Jordanian action nonetheless rendered it virtually 
impossible. 27 
 
In addition to the broad strategic considerations noted above, domestic political 
factors also influenced the development of the Jordanian-Syrian alignment, including 
the presence of a core constituency within Jordan, led by the Prime Minister, which 
saw closer alignment with Syria as a necessary measure to ensure more lasting stability 
and security for the Kingdom. Yet, particularly at the start of the rapprochement, 
there remained many elites within the Hashimite regime who were highly cynical 
about Syrian intentions. The 1970 invasion remained vivid in the memories of all 
Jordanian policy-makers. Pro-Syrian factions in Jordan, however, argued that the 
present regime in Damascus was different from the more hostile ones that had pre- 
ceded it, and that President Asad, in particular, had refused to support the Jadid regime's 
1970 invasion of Jordan.28  But the issue that led to the development of an increasingly 
strong pro-alliance constituency, among both public and private sector elites, concerned 
the economic opportunities of closer alignment. 
 
The most influential player amongst the pro-Syrian elites in the Jordanian regime 
was Prime Minister Zayd al-Rifa'i himself. Rifa'i, a member of a key regime 
family, had close ties to Syria and was long noted for his pro-Syrian sympathies. For 
Rifa'i, the natural state of Jordanian relations was unity with Syria. It was the absence 
of this unity that was the aberration, not the reverse. In his words: 
On any priority list [in inter-Arab relations], Syria would have to be at the 
top. This is due to a host of factors, including the shared historical heritage of 
the two states. Damascus is closer to Amman than Aqaba. And close ties exist 
regardless of the diplomatic climate at any given time. There are close trade, 
education, and family links ... Close relations with Syria are the natural state 
of affairs, not just normal friendly relations as with other Arab states.29 
 
But as Laurie Brand has argued, beyond both the regional-strategic and domestic 
political factors discussed above, economic incentives appear to have been the overriding 
imperative in the Jordanian-Syrian rapprochement and the development of 
close relations.30  Jordanian elites in the private sector had long maintained links to 
Syria, given the overland transport route from Jordan's port on the Red Sea, Aqaba, 
across Syria toward Turkey and Europe. In addition, the close proximity of Damascus 
and Amman in particular led to numerous business linkages between the two capitals 
despite the periods of hostility that had characterized their political relations. Not 
surprisingly, any hint of warming relations between Jordan and Syria found immediate 
and active support from private- and public-sector business elites in both countries. 
 
By serving on the joint committees and subcommittees set up to foster greater 
Jordanian-Syrian cooperation, these elites pressed for agreements between the two 
states aimed at lowering economic barriers between them, and thereby facilitating 
cooperation in profit-making ventures. In a bid to strengthen the economic components 
of the alignment, Jordan and Syria signed a series of agreements designed to 
remove all tariff barriers between them, to coordinate customs charges and restrictions, 
and to cooperate on tourism. In addition, several joint economic projects were 
established, including companies involved in food production and textile manufacturing, 
as well as land and sea transportation.31 
In addition to the motives of private business elites, however, there were also 
strong economic incentives for closer alignment with Syria from the perspective of 
public sector revenue. This is the causal factor that Brand has described as "budget 
security." One of the revenue motivations behind the alignment, therefore, involved 
the desire by Jordan and Syria to coordinate as key front line states in appealing for 
aid to the wealthier Gulf states. Both Jordan and Syria had been promised considerable 
Arab aid at the 1974 Rabat Summit of the Arab League. By cooperating in the 
form of a "united front" it was hoped that together they would be able to pressure the 
Gulf states to follow through with their financial pledges. 32 
 
Another consideration in this economic vein concerned the desire to prevent, in 
the future, the economic costs that had often characterized the assorted Jordanian- 
Syrian rifts of the past. In short, Jordanian officials wanted the economic dimensions 
of the Jordanian-Syrian alignment developed not only for short term profitability, but 
also to create more solid political relations through a foundation of increasingly irrevocable 
economic ties. During the repeated crises between the two states in the past, 
Syria had frequently closed off its border, with immediate economic repercussions 
for Jordan. The border closures had invariably carried with them economic costs, due 
to the reliance of much of Jordanian trade and transport on Syrian routes northward to 
Turkey and Europe 33 
 
Close economic integration within the new alliance was therefore intended not 
only to provide a firmer basis for political coordination in the alignment, but was also 
"strategic insurance" against any future deterioration of political relations by preventing 
the possibility of any more costly border closures.34  By solidifying the economic 
basis of the alignment, or its "low politics" foundation, the Jordanians in particular 
hoped that the economic dimensions of the bilateral relationship would be insulated 
from future disagreements, even in military and security affairs. And conversely, they 
hoped that the solid and mutually beneficial economic basis of the alignment would 
serve to temper any disagreements in the realm of high politics. 
 
In sum, unlike the temporary wartime pacts that had emerged between Jordan 
and Syria in 1948 and 1967, the alignment of the late 1970s had a more solid basis in 
economic motivations and in successful economic cooperation. According to Jordan's 
Prime Minister Rifa'i: 
 
All previous [inter-Arab] mergers, however, were on the basis of mergers from 
the top down. We wanted to build both up. Top and bottom. On the basis of 
what we called "complementarity." This began with joint economic and agricultural 
projects. Then proceeded by unifying curricula in schools. And then 
moved on to political coordination, regarding the movement of peoples, policy 
coordination, and internal security cooperation.• 35 
 
The two states had abandoned their cold war in favor of coordination in trade, 
investment, tourism, joint ventures, and collective lobbying for aid from the oil wealthy 
Gulf states. And unlike the many unsuccessful acts of "unification" that had 
emerged as a part of inter-Arab relations in the 1950s and 1960s, the less-heralded 
Jordanian-Syrian alignment of 1975-79 had involved far greater economic integration, 
political cooperation, and security coordination. It was, in short, a much more 
substantial alignment than its more ideologically charged predecessors from the Nasir era . 36 
 
 
THE COLLAPSE OF THE ALLIANCE AND THE RETURN OF THE 
JORDANIAN-SYRIAN COLD WAR 
 
Political unity, security cooperation, and even economic integration were all 
fast becoming a reality for Jordanian-Syrian relations in the mid-1970s, but after only 
four years these qualities would give way to mutual suspicion, mistrust, and hostility 
by the close of the decade. One of the main issues that undermined the Jordanian- 
Syrian alignment was the intensive lobbying effort toward Jordan by the Iraqi regime. 
The emergence of the Jordanian-Iraqi alignment is a topic for yet another 
article, but suffice it to say that the warming of Jordanian-Iraqi relations was viewed 
with hostility from Damascus, and came in a context of severe domestic and regional 
insecurity for the Asad regime. Syria had become mired in the bloody war in Lebanon, 
was faced with major bouts of domestic unrest and even urban terrorism, and 
had just experienced the rapid rise and fall of its own brief flirtation with Iraq. Aware 
of Syrian misgivings regarding the emerging Jordanian-Iraqi alliance, Jordan's new 
Prime Minister, 'Abd al-Hamid Sharaf, had taken pains to stress to Syrian officials 
that the new alignment did not in any way constitute an anti-Syrian bloc.37 His colleagues 
in Damascus, however, did not share his optimistic views of the new alignment. 38 
 
Yet Syrian hostility to Jordan's increasingly warm relations with the regime in 
Baghdad did not emerge from a vacuum, but rather came in the wake of Syria's own 
failed "unification" project with Iraq in 1978. The project was short-lived, however, 
as Iraqi authorities claimed to have found evidence of a "plot" by Syrian Ba'thists to 
overthrow their counterparts in Baghdad. Despite Iraqi claims, it seems likely that the 
brief warmth between the two countries was primarily intended as a device to consolidate 
Saddam Husayn's own regime as he emerged in 1979 from his ten-year position 
as the "strong man" behind the regime, assumed the presidency for himself, and 
conducted an extensive purge within the Iraqi Ba'thist state. 39  For their part, the 
Syrians felt that they had been duped, and had been used as a reluctant pawn in a 
Machiavellian ploy within Iraqi domestic politics.40  Almost overnight, the unification 
project deteriorated into hostility and polemics between the two regimes. 41 
 
The Jordanian regime, meanwhile, had not been enthusiastic about the prospect 
of such a powerful union emerging and looming over it, particularly if that union had 
any future desire to absorb Jordan as well. While not happy with the idea of Iraqi- 
Syrian union, Jordanian policy-makers had nonetheless hoped to increase their links 
to Iraq while also preserving their alignment with Syria. When Iraqi-Syrian relations 
plummeted back to their more familiar hostility, however, it became clear that Jordan 
would soon be faced with a choice: either Syria or Iraq, but not both. Jordan gravitated 
steadily closer toward Iraq, hastening the final collapse of the Jordanian-Syrian 
alignment. 
 
The Arab League Summit held in Amman on November 25, 1980, made abundantly 
clear that the once close Jordanian-Syrian alignment was indeed over. While 
laying bare the depth of the Jordanian-Syrian rift, the summit also underscored the 
broader political divisions within the Arab world. Syria not only refused to attend the 
Jordan-based meeting, but also organized a boycott which came to include Algeria, 
Lebanon, Libya, the PLO, and South Yemen. 
 
Arab positions regarding the outbreak of war between Iran and Iraq marked the 
line of demarcation in this inter-Arab polarization, and fed into an atmosphere of 
recriminations and accusations between the Arab regimes. This new conflict in the 
Persian Gulf had come on the heels of the earlier inter-Arab rift over Egypt's separate 
peace with Israel. Jordanian King Husayn's intentions, in particular, as host of the 
1980 summit, were focused on rallying an Arab world divided over Sadat's treaty 
with Israel, in order to provide a united front against revolutionary Iran. A Syrian-led 
boycott of the summit, however, only served to underscore the disunity of Arab ranks. 
 
Making the Jordanian position clear. King Husayn was unreserved in his criticisms 
during a speech at the summit. He roundly condemned Syria and Libya, in 
particular, for supporting Iran in its war against Iraq. The Hashimite regime had in 
fact played an extremely active role throughout the summit as the key lobbyist rallying 
pan-Arab support for the Iraqi war effort. 42  Given the level of hostility that 
existed between Damascus and Baghdad, the Asad regime viewed the Hashimite actions 
as nothing less than a betrayal. In addition, this challenge from its former ally 
came at a particularly vulnerable time for the regime in Damascus, as it attempted to 
meet not only regional challenges to its security, but also even more severe domestic 
threats from Islamist militancy throughout Syria. 43 
The Asad regime, therefore, responded to the King's comments with more than 
words. Immediately after the summit meeting had ended, 247,000 Syrian troops and 
more than 800 tanks were deployed along the Jordanian border. Jordan responded 
with 57,000 troops of its own, setting the stage for a major confrontation.44 According 
to one of President Asad's advisors: 
 
[When] the Syrian-Iraqi crisis, the most important one, broke out, Jordan acted 
first as an intermediary, then sided whole-heartedly with Iraq. And this made 
Syria exercise her military strength vis-a-vis Jordan in both covert and overt 
ways.45 
 
Active mediation by Saudi Arabia was instrumental in defusing the military confrontation 
and pulling the two countries back from the brink of war. The high level of 
political hostility, however, would remain between the two countries with implications 
not only for their regional security, but also for their domestic stability, as each 
attempted to subvert the other in the 1980s. 
 
In sum, the 1975-79 alignment between Jordan and Syria, while very real, nonetheless 
ultimately collapsed and heralded the return of the cold war between the two 
states. As the above discussion makes clear, the earlier 1975-79 episode of Jordanian- 
Syrian amity had its earliest roots in regime change in Damascus, followed by changes 
in the external strategic environment. But even more importantly, it was also rooted in 
changes in the economic bases of each regime's own domestic security. It would take 
20 years before the two regimes once again began aligning toward one another, in an 
attempt to end their cold war once and for all. 
 
 
DEJA WALL OVER AGAINENDING 
THE JORDANIAN-SYRIAN COLD WAR, 1999-? 
 
In February 1999, King Husayn of Jordan died after a long battle with cancer. 
Merely weeks before his death, however, Husayn had abruptly left his medical treatment 
in the United States, returned to Jordan, and changed the order of succession 
from his long-serving brother. Crown Prince Hasan, to his eldest son 'Abdullah.46 
The change was nothing short of shocking, since Hasan had served as Crown Prince 
and presumed successor, and indeed had been groomed to be king, for 34 years. Yet 
the succession took place smoothly, with 'Abdullah II crowned King. Just over a year 
later, in June 2000, President Hafiz al-Asad died in Damascus, having ruled for 30 
years as head of the Ba'thist regime in Syria. Unlike Jordan, however, Syria was a 
republic, and an avowedly radical one at that. Yet here, too, a son — Bashar al-Asad 
— had been appointed successor to his long-serving father. 
 
King Husayn and President Hafiz al-Asad had remained rivals throughout most 
of their respective tenures. In addition to their personal dislike for one another, they 
had been influenced by the local and global cold wars and had frequently taken opposite 
positions in regard to the Arab-Israeli conflict and peace process. Asad passed 
from the scene still steadfast in his stalled peace talks with Israel, while Husayn had in 
1994 rapidly pushed through a full and formal peace treaty with the state of Israel. 
When King Husayn passed away in 1999, he and President Asad had never really 
reconciled. Yet Asad surprised Jordanians and, indeed, the world, by arriving with a 
large entourage, including most top Syrian officials, to march in King Husayn's funeral 
procession and to pay his respects to the late King's son and heir, 'Abdullah. 
Jordanian-Syrian rapprochement, in short, began to some extent that very day. 
 
President Bashar al-Asad and King 'Abdullah II were similar in several ways: 
both were in their mid-thirties, both were interested in computers and communications 
and changing their societies, and both succeeded a leader that served so long that 
most citizens remembered no other. But the thaw in Jordanian-Syrian relations began 
more directly as the result of the Jordanian, rather than the Syrian, succession. King 
Husayn died more than a year before Hafiz al-Asad also passed away. Asad had made 
clear his desire for warmer relations through his good-will gesture of travelling to 
Jordan for Husayn's funeral. And shortly after the mourning period was over. King 
'Abdullah wasted no time in attempting to shore up a new relationship not only with 
Syria, but also with other key Arab states from Morocco to Egypt to the Gulf monarchies. 
Following the succession in Damascus, President Bashar al-Asad also seemed 
to embrace the idea of active rapprochement and even of emerging alignment between 
Jordan and Syria. 
 
The reasons for the rapprochement lay not only in the presence of the new 
leaders, but also in the absence of the old ones. One of Jordan's former prime ministers, 
in pondering this issue, suggested that "for our relations with Syria, it's natural it 
would get better because the two old pillars have disappeared and with that came two 
new leaders, but without the same inhibitions. And they are the same age and generation.47 
He continued: 
 
The major issue that isn't noticed enough in our relations with other Arab 
countries was, well. King Husayn was an ambitious man. He inherited the 
philosophy of the Arab revolt, the ancestry of the Prophet Muhammad, and his 
grandfather's vision [which] he shared of uniting the Arabs with Jordanian 
leadership and with the Hashimite family. King 'Abdullah does not claim to 
be the king of all the Arabs. Just the King of Jordan. So these people — Syria, 
Palestinians, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia — are not as edgy as they were with King 
Husayn. They are not threatened by 'Abdullah. 48 
 
In a similar vein, one of Jordan's former foreign ministers stressed the leadership 
transition and the end of an earlier more ideological era in explaining the Jordanian- 
Syrian shift: 
 
With our changed relations with Syria, you had the deaths of two characters: 
King Husayn and Hafiz al-Asad. They were from a different generation and a 
different ideology. King Husayn was an Arab nationalist. He believed in the 
vision of Arab unity and the vision of the Great Arab Revolt. Other leaders 
therefore saw him as a danger to their separate interests. Asad too was the same 
only from the Ba'thist perspective. The new generation of leaders understands 
the power of the West, and the terrible power of what Israel can do. These 
people are no danger to each other. Asad knows that 'Abdullah is not trying to 
unite Syria, and vice versa. 'Abdullah knows Bashar is not pushing for greater 
Syria. They are pragmatic. They are both Western educated. Both are not 
ideological as in the past sense. 'Abdullah's ideology, what he wants, is development 
of Jordan mainly. Not ideology. Plus they have a personal relationship. 
They knew each other before either took power. 49 
 
This underscores key reasons for the ending of the Cold War between Jordan and 
Syria; but it also suggests that both states — in the absence of the longstanding ideological 
and personal baggage — had, at the time, more regional alignment options in 
general 50  For Jordan in particular, this means that relations with Syria no longer hold 
instant implications for other inter-Arab relationships. Indeed, in the absence of the 
personal rivalries and the opposite stances that had characterized the Jordanian-Syrian 
Cold War and the Iran-Iraq War, Jordan no longer seems to have to choose between 
aligning with either Syria or Iraq. And while the Jordanian-Iraqi relationship did 
suffer in the mid- and late 1990s, that was not attributable to warming Jordanian- 
Syrian ties. 51 
 
The great majority of agreements signed between the two states to mark the 
beginning of their rapidly increasing cooperation were explicitly about economic 
concerns, tn August 1999, Jordan and Syria signed a trade agreement eliminating 
tariffs on selected products in bilateral trade. More than two years later, in October 
2001, the two countries pushed this process much further by formalizing a Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA) between them. The Jordanian-Syrian FTA entered into force in 
2002 and lifted tariffs on most goods exported from either country to the other. Some 
items such as clothing and shoes were allowed a temporary tariff exemption, leaving 
tariffs as high as 60%, but with the intention of eventually eliminating these too, in a 
series of reductions. 52  Both countries have been undergoing processes of economic 
restructuring and adjustment in recent years, albeit in varying degrees. In the Jordanian 
case, adjustment began in 1989 when the Kingdom was forced to turn to the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) for economic aid when Jordan was unable to 
meet its debt obligations. Since that time, the Jordanian government has implemented 
a series of IMF programs, each time triggering political upheavals. 53 Thus Jordan's 
economic and political liberalization has been tumultuous at times, and has since the 
late 1990s shown signs of an increasing disconnect between the political and economic 
sides of the project. Political liberalization has often stalled or slid backwards, 
precisely because economic adjustment has proceeded apace with corresponding political 
discontent. 
 
For all its limitations, however, the Jordanian reform process has gone much 
further than that in Syria. And this fact led to a series of meetings between Jordanian 
and Syrian officials specifically to explore paths toward reform. Jordan's former 
Foreign Minister, 'Abd al-Ilah al-Khatib, noted: 
 
Bashar started though on a very positive note in relations with Jordan. But 
maybe the power centers in Syria constrain him from moving too much. In the 
year 2001 we had several meetings at the Dead Sea, meetings about reform 
and so on. The Syrian delegation was very impressed with the changes in 
Jordan, but after that, they were pulled back and contacts were strictly limited. 
Maybe more powerful figures in the regime limited these contacts. They feared 
too much influence for similar changes in Syria. Especially with two younger 
leaders who know the world. The ingredients of rapprochement were there. 
Other factors limited how close we could actually get, though. I think Bashar 
was pulled back, away from the progressive stance of Jordan. 54 
 
Despite very high expectations for political liberalization upon the accession of Bashar 
to the presidency, the Syrian state has seemed to conduct business as usual in its 
essentially authoritarian fashion. Economic liberalization in Syria has been slow and 
limited, but it has made inroads since the early 1990s, and it is certainly more visible 
than any political liberalization. 55  It is in this context of privatization, liberalization, 
and freer flow of goods that business elites in both countries are increasing transnational 
links across the Jordanian-Syrian border. Should this economic process continue, it 
may provide an increasingly vocal constituency in favor of deeper Jordanian-Syrian 
relations at other levels as well. 
 
Jordan, for its part, has seemed to be virtually obsessive about achieving economic 
agreements. While Syria has been more reluctant, the Jordanian government 
has embraced entirely the Bretton Woods institutions (the IME, World Bank, and the 
World Trade Organization), while also actively pressing for a free trade agreement 
with the United States. King 'Abdullah, in particular, was intent on securing the US Jordanian 
FTA, as a key economic factor solidifying Jordan's political and military 
alliance with the United States. The agreement might have received greater scrutiny 
or criticism within the United States at some other time, but in the immediate aftermath 
ofthe September 11,2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, Congress quickly 
approved and ratified the deal. 
 
Jordan may have cemented its image as the virtual poster-country for embracing 
globalization, when it hosted a special meeting of the World Economic Forum (WEF) 
in June 2003, and later in 2004 and 2005 as well. 56  The WEF, gathering together the 
world's most powerful government and business elites (including the world's main 
creditors) meets in Davos, Switzerland, every winter. Bringing the WEF to Jordan's 
Dead Sea resort for what were becoming annual meetings was something of a diplomatic 
and perhaps economic coup for King 'Abdullah. But even before the WEF 
began meeting regularly in Jordan, the Jordanians had strongly encouraged the new 
Syrian President to follow their economic lead, including in discussions shortly after 
the succession. Jordanian Prime Minister Fayiz Tarawnah accompanied King 'Abdullah 
on his condolence visit to Damascus in 2000, but came away convinced that there 
were limits to how fast Bashar could move: 
 
We met for lunch on the fortieth day of the mourning period. Bashar asked 
many questions. He asked King 'Abdullah specific questions about 
privatization, investment, opening the economy. He clearly wanted to open 
up Syria. King 'Abdullah was very enthusiastic about this. He offered any and 
all experience and help Jordan could offer. He even encouraged Bashar to go 
to Davos to the World Economic Forum possibly even as part of a joint Jordanian- 
Syrian delegation. He encouraged Bashar to introduce himself. He said 
they would be interested because they don't know Syria or your father. The 
failures are not because of Bashar but because of structures ... the old guard 
still surrounded him. All the president's men were still there. 57 
 
With Jordanian prodding, Syria sent its own representatives to the Jordan WEF meeting 
in 2003 and had earlier applied for membership in the World Trade Organization. 
Syria's WEF delegation, however, was made up of private business people, rather 
than government and party officials, underscoring the regime's still tentative approach 
to such global capitalist institutions. 
 
Besides economic interests in boosting bilateral trade and encouraging foreign 
investment, another key concern of both Jordan and Syria is the issue of water. Both 
countries experienced several years of droughts in the late 1990s. The problem was 
more severe for Jordan, with seven consecutive summer droughts and considerably 
less water than Syria. Jordan had already had to turn to Syria to supplement its water 
supply in 1999 and 2000. By 2001, the two countries concluded a new water agreement 
that increased the flow of Yarmuk river water to Jordan. In addition, the new 
agreement revived an earlier 1987 plan between Jordan and Syria to work jointly on 
the creation of the al-Wihdah dam, which is to create a reservoir along the Yarmuk 
river basin. In the meantime Syria continued to divert water to help alleviate Jordan's 
chronic drought problem. 58  Jordanian economist Riad al-Khouri has suggested that a 
certain symbiosis may develop here in which Syria helps Jordan with its water supply, 
while Jordan helps reform Syria's cumbersome and antiquated banking system amounting, 
in his words, to "liquidity" of two very different types.' 59 
 
But besides the economic incentives for, and results of, greater Jordanian-Syrian 
cooperation, some of the most interesting results of the rapprochement have been 
more strictly political. Syrian opposition exiles, especially those affiliated with the 
Muslim Brotherhood, had been welcome in Jordan for decades. But since President 
Bashar al-Asad assumed power in 2000, and in the context of warming Jordanian- 
Syrian relations, the Kingdom has deported a series of leading members of the Syrian 
Muslim Brotherhood. 60 It was against the Muslim Brotherhood in 1982 that the Syrian 
state had used its most extreme force ever in crushing domestic opposition. Unlike 
the adversarial roles played by the Jordanian and Sydan mukhabarat during their 
decades of cold war, now the two states seem to be edging toward intelligence cooperation. 
Jordan's director of the mukhabarat, in fact, has become a regular participant 
in most major bilateral meetings and agreements. While Jordan moved to expel select 
Syrian dissidents, the Syrian state conversely agreed to a modicum of media pluralism 
by allowing Jordanian newspapers to begin circulating in Syria for the first time in 20 
years.61 
 
Having apparently abandoned support for each other's opposition movements, 
and having instead concluded a series of political and economic agreements, the Jordanian- 
Syrian Cold War had clearly come to an end. But the rapprochement and even 
emergent alignment between the two states was challenged almost immediately by 
regional and global crises: first, in the form of the second Intifada in the Palestinian 
territories; second, in the form of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the US and the 
resultant US military campaign in Afghanistan and its global campaign against terrorism; 
and third, in the form of the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. Jordanian and Syrian 
responses to these events are addressed in the sections that follow. 
 
 
JORDANIAN-SYRIAN RELATIONS AFTER THEIR "COLD WAR" 
 
Given the rising intensity of regional crises, one might expect differences over 
high politics issues to drive a wedge between Jordan and Syria once again, especially 
in terms of the Arab-Israeli conflict and peace process or in terms of relations with 
Gulf states. But here too, the regimes are actually in sync for the most part. Jordan 
had re-achieved its pre-Gulf War relations with all of the Arab Gulf monarchies, 
while Syria became even more formally aligned with these states through the Damascus 
Declaration alignment. 62  Despite differences regarding relations with Israel, 
both states support the Palestinian Intifada, both oppose Israel's violent suppression 
of that uprising, especially under the Sharon government, and both even agree on 
broader security issues throughout the region. 
 
A key point, then, is that these are not the days of the old Arab Cold War, as 
described by Malcolm Kerr, with states being distinguished as radical republics versus 
conservative monarchies. In some respects, Syria and Jordan might even still fit these 
categories, but the radical republic and the conservative monarchy are now closely 
linked and have shown no sign of concern regarding the other's political system. 
More importantly, the distinctions drawn by US policy-makers between radical and 
moderate Arab states also seem to apply less than perhaps they ever did. For example, 
Syria has made clear on countless occasions its opposition to terrorist attacks on the 
United States, while also condemning US and European double standards regarding 
Palestinian rights. But this is not just the position of a "radical Syria." Rather, it is the 
position of Syria and of Jordan, Egypt, the Gulf states, and indeed of most Arab 
countries. Jordan and Syria agreed further that the sanctions on Iraq (before the fall of 
Saddam Husayn) punished the Iraqi people and not the regime, and that they should 
have been lifted. 
 
When the United States created its military buildup for an attack on Iraq, Jordan 
and Syria both opposed the invasion. President Bashar al-Asad was, admittedly, far 
more vocal and one of the strongest opponents of the invasion. But Jordan's acquiescence 
to the deployment of US troops to man Patriot missile batteries within the 
Kingdom was seen by the government in Amman as purely defensive, and by no 
means an endorsement of invasion. Even on the thorny issue of terrorism, it is not just 
Syria that objects to the US and the United Nations condemning terrorism without 
distinguishing between al-Qa'ida and national liberation movements. The latter term 
is seen by both Syria and Jordan as potentially including Hizbullah in Lebanon as well 
as Palestinian resistance groups from Hamas to the Popular Eront for the Liberation 
of Palestine (PELP). The Jordanian government maintained this viewpoint even as it 
closed down Hamas offices in the Kingdom; Hamas could continue to operate, but not 
in Jordan. 
 
As threats continued to emanate from the Bush Administration against Syria in 
particular, Jordan and once again most Arab countries insisted that this must stop. 
Indeed, unlike Iraq, Syria is directly allied not only to states that the US government 
opposes (such as Iran) but also to major US allies (such as Egypt and all six Arab Gulf 
monarchies). Yet Syria's regional position has without question deteriorated steadily 
in the early 21st century. The US invasion of Iraq has led to an extensive insurgency 
and the rise of routine terrorism within Iraq. Foreign Islamist fighters, some of them 
Syrian, crossed into Iraq to join the fight against the US occupation. While such 
fighters crossed into Iraq from several countries, presumably including Jordan, the 
Bush Administration focused on Syria specifically, alleging Syrian support in facilitating 
such crossings and in supporting the Iraqi insurgency. The Syrian government 
strongly denied these allegations, but US military attacks began to focus on towns on 
the Syrian-Iraqi border, while the Administration continued to threaten the use of 
force against Syria. Since the Bush Administration had already invaded and occupied 
two countries in the region, such threats had to be taken very seriously indeed. 
 
Tensions grew stronger still when Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri was 
assassinated by a car bomb in Beirut on February 14, 2005. Suspicion within Lebanon 
immediately focused on Syria. The resulting outrage in Lebanon led to vast street 
demonstrations calling for justice and for the ouster of Syrian forces from Lebanon. 
As the demonstrations and international condemnation of alleged Syrian complicity 
in the assassination developed into a crescendo, Syria was obliged finally to withdraw 
its remaining military forces from Lebanon. In October 2005, the first of a series of 
UN investigative reports charged Lebanese and Syrian intelligence agencies with complicity 
in Hariri's murder, leading the US Administration to call for action from the 
UN Security Council. 
 
The Jordanian regime, meanwhile, had supported UN calls for full Syrian withdrawal 
from Lebanon. Jordan maintained its post-Cold War relations with Syria, but 
given the overwhelming series of crises and of Syrian missteps, the damage was 
sufficient to prevent any real Jordanian-Syrian alignment or alliance from forming 
after all. Yet just as importantly, there was also no sign that Jordan and Syria were 
returning to their earlier hostility. Jordanian policy-makers and policy advisors seemed 
to have reached a kind of consensus: that Bashar still held real possibilities, that the 
problem in Syria (and hence on Jordanian-Syrian relations warming still further) was 
rooted in old guard Ba'thists, and that the various policy mistakes were leading to a 
showdown within Syria — if US threats didn't in the meantime strengthen the hands 
of regime hardliners. In the view of Jordan's former Foreign Minister Kamal Abu 
Jaber, "Today, despite Bashar, the old guard is still in power in Syria, but Jordanian- 
Syrian relations are at least on an even keel, somewhere between warm and tepid.63 
Jordanian Senator Layla Sharaf, Chair of the Senate's Foreign Relations Committee, 
emphasized that "Jordan and Syria have settled our minor border questions, our minor 
little tiffs; and Bashar is a much better person than his regime.64  Similarly, a 
former prime minister stated flatly that "the old man has died. His son is more pro- 
gressive. A reformer. But I don't know if he will be able to change the powerful 
people around him." 65 Another former prime minister agreed, but also expressed the 
disappointment that many Jordanian officials felt, while also continuing to offer Jordan 
as a bridge between Syria and its US detractors: 
 
Syria could have leaned on us, but maybe they still don't think we are a 
country. Just Southern Syrians maybe. But still our relations are not hostile. 
We have regular meetings. There is the higher committee on Jordanian-Syrian 
relations, which meets regularly. I would say luke warm relations, but no 
hostility. Jordan remains ready with its good offices for Syria.66 
 
One of Jordan's key foreign policy advisors argued, however, that even Syria's debacles 
might actually provide the means for Bashar to truly create his own regime, 
rather than struggle with the one he inherited from his father: 
 
I have a hunch that a struggle for power is beginning in Syria. The Bashar 
school versus his brother-in-law [in charge of military intelligence] and others 
who are more conservative. Bashar may be able to use their debacle in Lebanon 
to take policy into his own hands. Withdrawal may even strengthen his 
hand in domestic politics.67 
 
At the 2005 Ba'th Party Conference, minor changes did indeed appear, leading to the 
retirement of long-time hardliner 'Abd al-Halim al-Khaddam. But as has been the 






As this article has made clear, much of the history of modern Jordanian-Syrian 
relations has consisted of political and at times even military confrontation. The mutual 
animosity between the two countries increased with changes in the regional system 
over time, especially in terms of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The animosity was also 
affected, however, by changes in their respective domestic systems. Since at least the 
early 1950s, with the onset of the Husayn regime in Amman, and a series of ideological 
military "strongmen" in Damascus, bilateral relations were for years marked by 
rivalries of radicalism versus conservatism, Arabism versus country-nationalism, and 
revolutionary republicanism versus traditional monarchism. The two states had also 
maintained vastly different approaches to the Palestinian-Israeli issue. While Jordan 
secured a peace treaty with Israel in 1994, Syria and Israel remained officially in a 
state of war well into the 21st century. Jordan and Syria took nearly opposite stances 
toward the 1980-88 and 1991 Gulf Wars, while also picking opposite sides during the 
US-Soviet global Cold War. Yet since independence the two states have, on merely 
two occasions, succeeded in ending their acrimonious relationship — their localized 
cold war — and achieved rapprochement. 
 
From 1975 to 1979, Jordan and Syria built a fairly strong (if temporary) alliance 
based on changing strategic, domestic, and economic factors. That alliance, however, 
ultimately collapsed. The real question for the present, then, is whether the 
current rapprochement will also amount to a full alliance in the near future, and more 
importantly, whether tbe warming of bilateral relations will last at all. The circumstances, 
I would argue, are significantly different this time around, especially under 
new leaderships with scant linkages to the headier ideological rifts that long characterized 
inter-Arab relations. The Jordanian and Syrian regimes are both run, for now, 
by leaders with somewhat similar goals and interests — at least in terms of economic 
development, access to foreign aid, and debt relief. 
 
The new Jordanian-Syrian relationship, like tbe earlier rapprocbement, is built 
on functional transnational ties and agreements in "low politics" — from cultural 
exchange through economic agreements. In both episodes, the main causal factors 
were rooted heavily in domestic politics and political economy, and only slightly in 
external security concerns or changes in the regional balance of power, contrary to 
Neorealist expectations. In botb cases, regime change in one or both capitals provided 
the opening for rapprochement, but the drive in each case came from broader concerns 
with shoring up tbe political economy of domestic regime security.69 ' Witb major 
political transitions within both countries in the post-Hafiz al-Asad and post-King 
Husayn eras, both countries have also undergone a transition in their very state identities. 
While many outside of Jordan and Syria persist in seeing these countries as the 
virtual embodiment of their late leaders, and hence view them as the binary and 
eternally opposite social constructs alluded to above, the reality is indeed far different 
and perhaps more mundane. For all their many differences, the regimes of Bashar al- 
Asad and King 'Abdullah II are not as ideological as those of their predecessors, and 
they agree on many issues. A key question, however, is whether — this time — the 
Jordanian-Syrian Cold War is over for good. 
 
Despite the emerging US-Syrian crisis, the Jordanian-Syrian rapprochement (if 
not alliance) did manage to hold. In sum, as noted above, in addition to their many 
shared economic interests — from trade, to water access, to joint aid lobbying toward 
the Gulf monarchies — Jordan and Syria also agreed even on some of the most 
contentious regional security issues of the day. And these lines of agreement are reinforced 
by frequent direct contacts between regime officials, including bilateral summitry 
between President Asad and King 'Abdullah. It is therefore probable at least 
that this rapprochement will lead to a more lasting positive relationship between Jordan 
and Syria than has heretofore been possible since the late 1970s. And even if 
bilateral relations are no longer likely to lead to a deeper level of alignment, alliance, 
or integration, one thing at least is clear: the Jordanian-Syrian Cold War is — once 
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